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I. Introduction
This article analyzes Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., only the second
major Alien Tort Statute (ATS) case to reach the United States Supreme Court.1
The narrow issue presented to the Court is whether corporations can be held
liable for violations of international law under the ATS. However, this article will
explain that while the issue of corporate liability is relatively clear, the Court is
likely to seize this opportunity to reshape ATS jurisprudence, possibly eliminating
the ATS as a tool to enforce international human rights standards in United
States courts.

* Mr. Henner, a 1980 graduate of Rutgers Law School, has maintained a solo practice in
Albany, New York concentrating in environmental, civil rights, and labor law since 1984.
1
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, 642
F.3d 268, 269 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g denied en banc, 642 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (No. 10-1491). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id.
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In Kiobel, like Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the plaintiffs allege that a
defendant oil company aided and abetted the Nigerian government’s violations
of human rights in connection with suppressing opposition to a proposed oil
pipeline by torture, arbitrary detention, and other mistreatment of its citizens.2
The claims in Kiobel are typical of many ATS cases where plaintiffs allege that a
multinational corporation, operating in a country outside of the United States,
has aided and abetted a repressive government in brutally suppressing opposition
to government policy.3
During oral argument, the conservative Justices focused on the ATS itself,
while the liberal Justices attempted to focus the discussion on the issue of corporate
liability. It appears that the Court is badly fractured between the pro-ATS wing
(Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, and Kagan) and the conservative anti-ATS wing
(Justices Roberts, Alito, Scalia, and Thomas).4 Kiobel provides an opportunity
for a results-oriented Supreme Court to finally end human rights activists’ efforts
to use the ATS to promote corporate social responsibility—perhaps by simply
establishing a new doctrine of corporate immunity or perhaps by eliminating the
jurisdictional reach of the ATS. Since the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, courts have routinely held that
United States courts may consider claims involving violations of human rights
in foreign countries.5 In Kiobel, the Supreme Court may choose to summarily
invalidate the entire body of modern ATS jurisprudence by declaring that United
States courts lack jurisdiction over extraterritorial claims.

2
See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW),
2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3293, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
3
The most prominent examples are Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); In re
South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
393 F.Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005); and Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F.Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal.
2002). More than thirty similar cases have resulted in published opinions.
4
Justices Scalia and Thomas previously disagreed with parts of the Court’s decision in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, which approved the use of the ATS as a tool to litigate claims of international
law violations occurring outside of the United States. 542 U.S. 692, 739 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Alito repeatedly questioned the constitutionality of the ATS under Article III
during oral argument in Kiobel. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel, No. 10-1491
(2012) [hereinafter Kiobel Hearing], available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/10-1491.pdf. However, as Justice Ginsberg observed, “Sosa accepted that
[such claims] would be . . . viable action[s].” Id. at 13. Chief Justice Roberts’s questions to Deputy
Solicitor General Kneedler indicate a skeptical approach to the ATS. See generally id.
5
See generally 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The Filartiga court observed, “[c]ommon law
courts of general jurisdiction regularly adjudicate transitory tort claims between individuals over
whom they exercise personal jurisdiction, wherever the tort occurred.” Id. at 885. Virtually every
ATS case involves actions alleged to have occurred outside of the United States. Nevertheless, in
2004, the Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Sosa, arguing
that the ATS did not authorize extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Court ignored this argument, tacitly
approving the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction. See Beth Stephens et al., International
Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts 42–43 (2d ed. 2008).
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On the other hand, the Court may reject the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals’ poorly reasoned and unprecedented rejection of the settled principle
of corporate liability, and clarify the rule set forth in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
that only well-established norms of international law can be enforced under the
ATS.6 The Court could also resolve complicated questions regarding whether and
when international law—as opposed to federal common law—should apply in
ATS cases.

II. Corporate Liability under the ATS
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in
Kiobel, Judge Cabranes, joined by the ultra-conservative Judge Jacobs,7 held
that corporations enjoy immunity from civil liability under the ATS.8 Kiobel
acknowledged that “[a] legal culture long accustomed to imposing liability on
corporations may, at first blush, assume that corporations must be subject to tort
liability under the ATS, just as corporations are generally liable in tort under
our domestic law (what international law calls ‘municipal law’).” 9 Judge Leval
concurred in the judgment to dismiss the complaint because he found that the
plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case, but wrote a strong concurring
opinion sharply disagreeing with the holding that corporations cannot be held
liable under international law.10
See generally 542 U.S. 692 (2004). In 2009, the author believed, like most observers of
ATS litigation, that there was no serious doubt that corporations were liable to the same extent as
any other party. In the author’s treatise Human Rights and the Alien Tort Statute: Law History and
Analysis, he noted that “defendants have continued to argue that the law of nations does not apply
to corporations,” but that In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y.
2009), had characterized the issue as a “long settled question.” Peter Henner, Human Rights
and the Alien Tort Statute: Law History and Analysis 207–08 (ABA Books 2009) [hereinafter Henner].
6

7
Judge Jacobs, the Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, was appointed by George Bush in
1992 after working nineteen years for a large Wall Street firm, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, LLP.
He is a member of the Federalist Society and before his opinion in Kiobel, he was known for
incorporating right-wing policy statements in his opinions and speeches. See Glenn Greenwald,
Dennis G. Jacobs: Case Study in Judicial Pathology, Salon (Sep. 22, 2011, 4:23 AM), http://www.
salon.com/2011/09/22/jacobs_3/singleton (commenting on Judge Jacobs’s virulent dissent from
the en banc holding in Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2011), and quoting
Jacobs as saying “the only purpose of this litigation is for counsel and their plaintiffs to act out their
fantasy of persecution . . . and to raise funds for self-sustaining litigation.” 667 F.3d at 203).
8

See generally, Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).

Id. at 117. In support of this proposition, Kiobel cited the landmark case of N.Y. Central
& Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 (1909), which held that corporations
can be held criminally liable. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117. Kiobel also cited the recent case of Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010), which held that corporations have the
same constitutional rights as natural persons to make political contributions. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at
117 n.11. Kiobel’s reference to Citizens United, while holding that corporations do not have the
same responsibilities as natural persons for tortious activities, is ironic, if not Orwellian.
9

10

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 150–96.
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The Kiobel majority held that the issue of corporate liability was a “norm”
that required a consensus of international law to be applied in ATS cases, and
that corporations were not civilly liable under international law for human rights
violations because no such norm existed.11 Prior to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals’ decision in Kiobel, corporate defendants had occasionally argued that
they were not subject to liability under the ATS, but had never been successful.
In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held
that the ATS “grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate
defendants.”12 In 2005, Judge Jack Weinstein held that “[a] corporation is not
immune from civil legal action based on international law” and adopted an
amicus brief that noted that corporate liability “had been widely recognized or
assumed by federal courts,” citing seven specific cases.13
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., decided by the same
Second Circuit Court of Appeals judges as Kiobel, held that a court should apply
international law to determine whether liability could be imposed for aiding and
abetting and for engaging in a joint criminal enterprise.14 However, the court
did not address the District Court’s lengthy discussion of corporate liability.15

11

Id. at 131– 45.

12

Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).

Loi v. Dow Chem. Co., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 54–59 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff ’d sub nom Vietnam
Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d. Cir. 2008) (citing Aguinda
v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000);
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153
(2d Cir. 1998); Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113–14 (5th Cir. 1988);
Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 2004); and Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 311–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
13

14

582 F.3d 244, 259–60 (2d Cir. 2009).

See id. at 268. The District Court considered the question of which corporate entity might
be liable in great detail. The court engaged in an extensive choice of law analysis, to determine
whether the parent or a subsidiary corporation would be a liable party. However, the District
Court accepted without question that some corporations might be liable parties under the ATS.
Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 682–87. On appeal, the Second Circuit “assume[d]
without deciding that the corporations . . . may be held liable for the violations of customary
international law . . . .” Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 261 n.12. The Kiobel majority
cited this footnote to characterize “the question of corporate liability . . . as an open question in
our Circuit.” 621 F.3d at 117 n.10 (citing Judge Korman’s concurrence in Khulumani v. Barclay
National Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 321–25 (2d Cir. 2007) and the majority opinion in Doe v. Nestle, 748
F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) for the proposition that corporations are not liable under the
ATS, and claiming that “others have acknowledged, either explicitly or implicitly, that the question
remained unanswered,” citing Judge Katzmann’s refusal to address the issue in Khulumani because
the issue had not been raised, and the United States’ brief in opposition to a petition for certiorari
from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d
Cir. 2009)). In Pfizer, the United States argued that the Supreme Court should not grant certiorari
to consider the issue because it had not been considered below. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9 n.2, Pfizer, Inc. v. Abdullahi, No.
09-34, 2010 WL 2214874 (May 28, 2010). In footnote ten, the Kiobel majority simply ignored
15
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The failure to address corporate liability is striking because eight months earlier
in Pfizer v. Abdullahi, a different Second Circuit panel held that a corporation
was liable under the ATS for conducting non-consensual medical experiments on
human subjects.16 In Pfizer, the court simply assumed, without comment, that a
corporation could be liable under the ATS for violating international law.
In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nigerian citizens alleged that Royal
Dutch Petroleum had aided and abetted the same Nigerian government human
rights abuses at issue in Kiobel.17 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit simply assumed the corporate defendant could be liable while
analyzing personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens at length,18 ultimately
resulting in a $15.5 million settlement on the eve of trial.19
Since the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Kiobel, corporate
defendants have asserted claims of corporate immunity in ATS cases. In two cases
where a lower court preceded Kiobel, defendants only raised the issue for the first
time on appeal, presumably because defendants had not believed that a claim
of corporate immunity had a reasonable chance of success before the District
Court.20 Corporate immunity has since been rejected by the United States Courts
of Appeals for the D.C., Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, which explicitly refused
to follow the Kiobel majority and instead relied upon the concurring opinion of
Judge Leval.21
In Doe v. Exxon-Mobil, Judge Rogers of the D.C. Circuit wrote a thorough and
scholarly response to Kiobel.22 She began by distinguishing the issue of “corporate

the weight of authority recognizing corporate liability under the ATS, such as Romero v. Drummond
Co., In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (2d Cir. 2005), and the
long history of cases simply assuming that corporations could be liable parties. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at
117 n.10.
See generally Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163 (holding Pfizer’s conduct violated an international
norm that was: (1) obligatory, (2) specific and definable, and (3) of mutual concern to the nations of
the world and therefore met the Sosa criteria for an ATS claim); see Henner, supra note 6, at 175–76.
16

17

Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2000).

18

Id. at 94–107 (analyzing personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens).

See Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights and EarthRights Int’l, Settlement Reached
in Human Rights Cases Against Royal Dutch/Shell (June 8, 2009), http://wiwavshell.org/documents/
Wiwa_v_Shell_Settlement_release.pdf. Note that this settlement was reached after the January
2009 argument in Kiobel, but before the September 2010 decision.
19

20
Cf. Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 394 n.6 (4th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
654 F.3d 11, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Corporate defendants allege that the issue of corporate liability is
a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than a merits question, and therefore can be raised for
the first time on appeal. Whether corporate liability is a jurisdictional question is one of the issues
currently before the United States Supreme Court in Kiobel.
21

See infra notes 85–88.

22

654 F.3d at 39–57.
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liability” from the “conduct-governing norms at issue in Sosa,” then concluded
that corporate liability was consistent with the purposes of the ATS, agency law,
and international law.23 In Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., the conservative
Judge Posner, mentioned as a potential Supreme Court nominee during the Bush
administration, also rejected corporate immunity, calling the Kiobel decision
an “outlier.”24
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, seven judges of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed a lower court ruling permitting
the action to proceed.25 The judges explicitly refused to follow Kiobel and held
that corporations could be liable parties.26 Writing for the court, Judge Schroeder
adopted “the sounder view . . . expressed in Judge Leval’s concurrence” and held
that the question of corporate liability was a question of international law; the
court should first determine whether a violation of a norm of international law
had been established, and then proceed to the question of whether a particular
private actor could be liable for it.27 He held there was “no legitimate basis” for the
“position that the [ATS] is a complete bar to corporate liability.” 28
Judge McKeown held that the “long and consistent tradition of corporate
liability in tort under the federal common law leaves no doubt that corporate
liability is available under the ATS.”29 However, Judge McKeown also held that

23

Id. at 41.

24

Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011).

671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011). The several lengthy opinions in Sarei have raised virtually
every extant issue under the ATS, and Sarei could be a vehicle for a very comprehensive review
of ATS principles by the Court. See generally id. The United States Supreme Court scheduled
the petition for certiorari for conference on March 2, 2012, but no decision was announced.
See John Elwood, Relist (and Hold) Watch, SCOTUS Blog (Mar. 8, 2012, 10:22 AM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/relist-and-hold-watch-13/. Because the Court has now ordered
supplemental briefing in Kiobel to address broader issues, which could effectively resolve all ATS
litigation, it is not clear whether the Court will ever find it necessary to review Sarei. See Lyle
Denniston, Kiobel to be Expanded and Reargued, SCOTUS Blog (Mar. 5, 2012, 2:01 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/kiobel-to-be-reargued/.
25

26
See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 747. The opinion of the court was written by Judge Schroeder,
joined by Judges Silverman and Berzon; Judges Reinhardt, Pregerson (joined by Rawlinson), and
McKeown (joined by Reinhardt and Berzon) wrote concurring opinions. All of those opinions held
that corporations could be liable under the ATS. The four dissenting Judges, Bea, Ikuta, Kleinfeld,
and Callahan, did not address the issue of corporate liability.
27

Id.

Id. at 748. The court noted that two district courts, one in Virginia and one in Maryland,
had found corporations liable for war crimes under the ATS and cited the Geneva Convention as
evidence that international law is not limited based upon the identity of the perpetrator of war
crimes. Id. at 764 (citing In re Xe Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2009) and
Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 744 (D. Md. 2010)).
28

29
Sarei, 671 F.3d at 785 (McKeown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Cook Cnty. v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 125 (2003)).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol12/iss2/2

6

Henner: When is a Corporation a Person - When It Wants to Be - Will Kiobe

2012

Will Kiobel End ATS Litigation?

309

the substantive international norms at issue in Sarei did not exclude corporate
liability under international law.30 Judge Reinhardt believed that corporations
can be liable under the ATS, but continued to maintain, as he did in Doe v.
Unocal,31 that questions like corporate liability should be determined as a matter
of domestic law (i.e., federal common law), rather than international law, and
federal common law provides for corporate liability.32
In a recent case, Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit declined to reach the question of corporate liability
and dismissed an ATS case on alternate grounds.33 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in the 1999 case of Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran,
Inc., simply assumed a corporation could be liable under the ATS.34 As previously
noted, the Eleventh Circuit in Romero v. Drummond Co. has flatly rejected the
idea of corporate immunity from liability.35 District courts in the Third and
Fourth Circuits have rejected the corporate immunity principle advocated by the
Kiobel majority.36
Kiobel now represents the law of the Second Circuit. The Southern District
of New York, within the Second Circuit, is home to some of the most prominent
ATS cases in the country, including In re South African Apartheid Litigation.37 In
that case, ATS plaintiffs are suing some of the biggest multinational corporations
in the world, alleging the corporations were liable under the ATS for aiding and
abetting apartheid.38 This issue might have reached the United States Supreme
Court as an appeal from the Second Circuit decision in Khulumani v. Barclay
National Bank Ltd.39 However, the Court could not review Khulumani in 2008
30

Id. at 789–92.

31

Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 964–69 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).

32

Sarei, 671 F.3d at 770–72 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).

33

658 F.3d 388, 394 n.6 (4th Cir. 2011).

34

197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999).

35

552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).

See Krishanthi v. Rajaratnam, No. 09–CV–05395 (DMC–JAD), 2011 WL 2607108, at
*1–2 (D.N.J. 2011); Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 744 (D. Md. 2010).
36

37
617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The decision of the district court was on remand
from the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Khulumani v.
Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).

The original list of defendants from the first reported decision in the case includes:
Citigroup, Inc., IBM Corporation, Schindle AG, Exxon Mobil Corporation, American Isuzu
Motors, Inc., and Barclays National Bank. See generally In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F.
Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
38

39
Khulumani addressed the issue of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS. Two judges
held that such liability exists, but Judge Katzmann based his concurring opinion on international law
while Judge Hall relied upon federal common law. 504 F.3d at 264–84 (Katzmann, J., concurring);
id. at 286–88 (Hall, J., concurring). Judge Korman’s dissent would have applied international law,
but also questioned whether corporations could be liable. Id. at 321–25 (Korman, J., dissenting).
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because it did not have a quorum due to conflicts of interest since a majority of
the Court owned stock in at least one of the corporate defendants.40 If Kiobel is
affirmed, the plaintiffs in In re South African Apartheid Litigation will be unable
to proceed.

III. The Kiobel Decision
A. Interpretation of Sosa
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the United States Supreme Court held that federal
courts have jurisdiction under the ATS to hear claims of violations of international
law only if there is a claim that an international norm that is “specific, universal,
and obligatory” was violated.41 International law clearly proscribes certain torts,
including torts committed by state actors (such as torture and extrajudicial
killing), and some torts committed by private citizens (such as piracy, and war
crimes).42 Other torts (such as environmental harm) that interfere with political
freedoms, and common law torts (such as assault and battery) do not violate
international law, either because there is no international consensus regarding the
tort, or because the action—even though perhaps prohibited by the law of every
nation—does not involve issues of international concern.43
Perhaps the most contentious issue in post-Sosa ATS litigation is the language
in footnote twenty, stating that a relevant question is “whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator
being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.” 44
In Kiobel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held this
statement meant a court can only find jurisdiction under the ATS if it concludes
that a particular tort violates international law and that international law would
impose liability upon a particular defendant.45 It is generally understood that
other sources of law, mostly federal common law, should apply to determine

40

See generally Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008).

542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41

See Sarei v. Rio Tino, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2011); Henner, supra note 6, at
133–77 (listing the torts which are actionable under the ATS and describing which ones require a
showing of state action).
42

43

Henner, supra note 6, at 190–98.

44

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20.

Kiobel’s holding, as has been observed in the briefs to the United States Supreme Court,
ignores the statement of the Court in its other ATS case: “The Alien Tort Statute by its terms does
not distinguish among classes of defendants, and it of course has the same defect after the passage
of the FSIA as before with respect to defendants other than foreign states.” Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989).
45
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procedural questions where international law does not provide an answer.46 The
Kiobel majority conceded that the domestic or municipal law of a particular
country should decide questions that constitute remedies.47 However, the court
then held that footnote twenty determined that “[w]hether a particular remedy . . .
can be enforced against a certain individual or entity is not a question of remedy;
it is a question of the scope of liability.” 48
Contrary to Kiobel, footnote twenty does not indicate that the question of
corporate liability is a norm of international law. Nor does footnote twenty suggest
any distinction between corporations and individuals. Instead, the footnote
simply drew a distinction between the liability of state actors and the liability of
private actors.49

B. Application of International Law
The Kiobel decision was presaged by Presbyterian Church of Sudan where
Judge Jacobs stated: “[F]ootnote [twenty] of Sosa, while nominally concerned
with the liability of non-state actors, supports the broader principle that the scope
of liability for ATS violations should be derived from international law.” 50 This
language is crucial to understanding the background of Judge Cabranes’s majority
opinion in Kiobel, which claims to consider “customary international law to

Judge Hall, in his concurring opinion in Khulumani, cites an amicus brief for the principle
that it is a “hornbook principle that international law does not specify the means of its domestic
enforcement” and cites other authority for this proposition. 504 F.3d 254, 286–87 (2d Cir. 2007).
46

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 147 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132
S. Ct. 472 (2011) (No. 10-1491).
47

Id. at 147 n.50. The sharpest criticism of Kiobel’s holding is Judge Rogers’ opinion in Doe
v. Exxon Mobil:
48

The Second Circuit’s approach overlooks the key distinction between norms of
conduct and remedies . . . and instead conflates the norms and the rules (the technical
accoutrements) for any remedy found in federal common law. And in so doing, the
majority in Kiobel . . . misreads footnote [twenty] in Sosa, on which it primarily
relies . . . .
654 F.3d 11, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Footnote twenty compared two previous ATS cases: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 791–95 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where the court analyzed whether individual terrorists could
be liable under the ATS without state action; and Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–41 (2d Cir.
1995), where Radovan Karadzic was held liable for atrocities in Serbia, even though he was not a
state actor. In In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, Judge Weinstein cited footnote twenty
for the proposition that “the Supreme Court acknowledged that corporations can be sued under the
ATS.” 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
49

50
Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009). Judge Jacobs was joined
by Judges Cabranes and Leval, the same panel that decided Kiobel. Presbyterian Church of Sudan also
declared that Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion in Khulumani, holding that international law
should determine whether a claim of aiding and abetting liability was actionable under the ATS, was
the law of the Second Circuit. Id.
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determine both whether certain conduct leads to ATS liability and whether the
scope of liability under the ATS extends to the defendant being sued.” 51
Courts have sharply disagreed as to whether international law or federal
common law should apply to ancillary issues under the ATS.52 The majority of
courts that have considered the issue have looked to international law, rather
than federal common law, to determine a variety of ancillary questions, such as
violations of aiding and abetting or conspiracy.53 However, even if international
law applies, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kiobel
was the first court to hold that an ancillary issue must satisfy an established “norm”
of international law as a precondition for a court to assert jurisdiction under
the ATS.54
The Kiobel majority concluded that corporate liability was not recognized
under international law.55 The court discussed the Nuremburg tribunals and
found that liability had only been imposed upon individuals, not corporations.56
Since Nuremberg, international tribunals such as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have only asserted jurisdiction over individuals,
and not corporations.57 The court did not find that treaties imposed corporate
liability and criticized the contrary conclusion reached by the District Courts in
Presbyterian Church of Sudan and In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation.58

C. Judge Leval’s Kiobel Concurrence
Judge Leval’s forty-seven-page concurring opinion characterized the majority as:
“[D]eal[ing] a substantial blow to international law and its undertaking to
protect fundamental human rights . . . [by permitting] one who earns profits by
51

621 F.3d at 120 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)).

For example, see the dispute between Judges Katzmann and Hall in Khulumani v. Barclay
National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); and Judges Pregerson and Reinhardt in Doe v.
Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202–03
(9th Cir. 2007).
52

The choice of law issue as to whether international law, rather than federal common law,
should apply when international law addresses the question has not been definitively decided. A
variety of procedural issues, such as statutes of limitations, standing to sue, and the availability of
certain types of relief, are not discussed in international law and must be addressed by the relevant
domestic or municipal law.
53

621 F.3d at 147–48 (characterizing the issue of whether a particular remedy can be enforced
against a party as a question of scope of liability, rather than a question of remedy).
54

55

Id. at 131–32.

56

Id. at 132–36.

57

Id. at 136–37.

58

Id. at 138–41, 140 n.41.
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commercial exploitation . . . [to] shield those profits . . . simply by taking the
precaution of conducting the heinous operation in the corporate form.”59
Judge Leval commenced his critique of the majority by describing the role that
international law has played in protecting fundamental human rights. He noted
that since the Nuremberg trials, international law has increasingly focused on
humanitarian and moral concerns (e.g., efforts to stop trafficking in women,
piracy, and genocide), and held that there was no purpose for international law
to adopt a principle of corporate immunity from liability.60 After discussing these
policy concerns, Judge Leval recounted the history of ATS litigation and noted the
absence of any precedent for the majority’s rule.61 He also cited the two opinions
of the Attorney General of the United States, which “refute . . . the majority’s view
that corporations have neither rights nor obligations under international law.” 62
Two separate parts of Judge Leval’s concurrence, parts II(C) and III(D),
criticized the majority for taking Sosa’s reference to a “norm” out of context. Judge
Leval argued that Sosa, including footnote twenty, plainly referred to norms of
conduct, not remedies.63 Sosa held that a United States court could award damages
under international law even in the absence of a specific statute authorizing a cause
of action.64 If damages against individual defendants can be awarded as a remedy
despite the absence of an “international norm,” there is no reason why corporate
liability cannot be imposed as well. If the Court in Sosa meant to require a
showing that corporate liability was a norm of international law, the Court would
never have approved the line of cases beginning with Filartiga, which routinely
determined that civil damages were an appropriate remedy despite the absence of
such a remedy under international law.65
Judge Leval also noted that the international tribunals cited by the majority were
criminal tribunals and the unsuitability of criminal punishment for corporations
does not determine whether civil liability can be found under international law.66
He maintained that an issue pertaining to civil liability is a question of damages

59

Id. at 149–50 (Leval, J., concurring).

60

Id. at 159–60.

61

Id. at 160–63.

Id. at 162 (discussing the opinions of the Attorney General in 1795 and 1907). The 1907
opinion specifically referenced the possibility that an American corporation could be sued by
Mexican nationals under the ATS for the diversion of the water of the Rio Grande. 26 Op. Att’y
Gen. 252, 253 (1907); see also 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57 (1795).
62

63

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 163–65, 176–79.

64

Id. at 164; see generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25 (discussing the modern line of cases beginning with Filartiga
v. Pena–Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d 1980)); supra note 5.
65

66

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 163.
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or remedies, not a substantive norm. The relative silence of international law
regarding such issues, including the question of civil liability for corporations,
simply means that international law leaves questions of remedies, including the
possibility of monetary damages against a particular entity, to the law of individual
nations. Judge Leval also noted that international law certainly did not provide an
exemption from liability for juridical entities such as corporations.67

D. Request for Rehearing and En Banc Review
Plaintiffs moved for a panel rehearing, and an unidentified Second Circuit
judge polled the other circuit judges as to whether the case should be heard en
banc.68 Because the full Circuit was evenly split, rehearing en banc was denied
for lack of a majority.69 Judge Lynch argued for the en banc review because of
the importance of the issue, the split in the circuits, and because he believed
the majority opinion was “very likely incorrect” for the reasons stated by Judge
Leval.70 Judge Katzmann wrote a separate dissent, stating he agreed with Judge
Leval’s reasoning.71 He also stated his disagreement with the Kiobel majority’s
conclusion that his opinion in Khulumani “leads to the inescapable conclusion”
that corporations cannot be liable under the ATS.72 Although Judge Katzmann’s
opinion in Khulumani relied upon international law to determine whether aiding
and abetting liability could be imposed under the ATS, he had not stated that
the question of aiding and abetting liability was a substantive “norm” under Sosa,
requiring universal acceptance.73
All of the three panel judges wrote opinions in response to the petition for
panel rehearing.74 Chief Judge Jacobs defended the original decision, arguing that
corporations should be immune from litigation because of their role as “engines
of their national economies, sustaining employees, pensioners and creditors—
and paying taxes.”75 He also argued that corporations needed to be protected
by prompt dismissal of ATS suits without “invasive discovery” and possible bad

67

Id. at 174–76.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2011), denying reh’g en
banc 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
68

69

Id.

Id. (Lynch, J., dissenting) (noting that Kiobel contradicted Romero v. Drummond Co., 552
F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008)).
70

71

Id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting).

72

Id. (quoting Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 130 n.33 (2d Cir. 2010)).

73

See id. at 380–81 (explaining the Kuhlumani opinion).

See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), denying
reh’g 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
74

75

Id. at 270 (Jacobs, J., concurring).
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public relations.76 He further argued “examples of corporations in the atrocity
business are few in history.”77
Judge Jacobs also noted the possible effects of ATS on foreign relations.78 His
opinion prompted Judge Cabranes, the author of the Kiobel appellate decision at
issue, to reaffirm that he based his opinion on “fidelity to the law, not a ‘policy
agenda.’” 79 Judge Leval, in uncommonly strong language for an appellate court
opinion, characterized Judge Jacobs’s opinion as revealing “an intense, multifaceted
policy agenda” and restated the arguments that he had made in his concurring opinion. 80
Judge Leval expressed amazement at Judge Jacobs’s confidence that
corporations do not behave badly and noted that “slave trading, piracy and
mercenary warfare can be lucrative but expensive businesses . . . requir[ing] capital
and . . . the protections afforded by such juridical forms of organization . . . .”81
Judge Leval also noted that Somalian pirates already have adopted a business
organization format, and he described the private contractors who perform armed
protective services abroad.82 He stated that “[t]he question is whether, when a
child enslaved for prostitution eventually obtains her freedom and sues, she can
recover the profits the business earned from the sale of her body. The majority’s
answer is an unhesitating No.” 83
Judge Leval noted the foreign policy concerns expressed by Judge Jacobs, but
characterized the majority’s remedy as “substantial overkill.” 84 He also pointed

76

Id. at 271.

Id. This statement is truly remarkable, in light of the specific allegations that have been made
in ATS cases alone, describing horrific allegations against multinational companies, particularly but
not exclusively companies involved in mining and oil. Cf. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163
(2d Cir. 2009) (non-conventional medical experimentation); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932
(9th Cir. 2002) (use of forced labor to build a pipeline); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (war crimes associated with oil development
in Sudan); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (torture and
extrajudicial killing of union activists); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (genocide, war crimes, racial discrimination in connection with mining); Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (use of slave labor by German subsidiary of United
States corporation during World War II).
77

78

Kiobel, 642 F.3d at 270 (Jacobs, J., concurring).

79

Id. at 272 (Cabranes, J., concurring).

80

Id. (Leval, J., dissenting).

81

Id. at 275.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 275 n.4.

84

Id. at 274.
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out the absence of any guidance from the Department of State with respect to the
Kiobel litigation.85

IV. Before the Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari solely to address the
questions of:
1. Whether the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, is a merits question,
as it has been treated by all courts prior to the decision below,
or an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, as the court of appeals
held for the first time.
2. Whether corporations are immune from tort liability for
violations of the law of nations such as torture, extrajudicial
executions or genocide, as the court of appeals decisions
provides, or if corporations may be sued in the same manner
as any other private party defendant under the ATS for such
egregious violations, as the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held.86
It is difficult to believe that the Kiobel holding of corporate immunity has
any validity because it is virtually unprecedented and is a clear misinterpretation
of both Sosa and international law. Additionally, it was not argued with any force
prior to Kiobel, and was rejected by every court to consider it—including the
United States Courts of Appeals for the D.C.,87 Seventh,88 Ninth,89 and Eleventh90
Circuits. Nevertheless, the case is now before the United States Supreme Court
with at least four members who are politically conservative and who may be
looking for a vehicle to stop ATS litigation against United States corporations.
This is only the third ATS case to reach the Supreme Court and the first case
since Sosa.91 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, who dissented in the Supreme
Court’s Sosa ruling, are still on the Court, and there are four Justices who did not
participate in Sosa (Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan).
85
Id. at 276. In its brief to the United States Supreme Court supporting the reversal of Kiobel,
the United States did not raise any foreign policy concerns. See generally Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491,
2011 WL 6425363 (Dec. 21, 2011).

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491, 2012 WL 687061 (Mar. 5, 2012),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/030512zr.pdf.
86

87

Doe v. Exxon-Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 39–57 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

88

Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011).

89

Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).

90

Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116–17. Kiobel inaccurately states
that “the Supreme Court in its entire history has decided only one ATS case,” referring to Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). Id. at 116–17. However, the Court addressed the question
91
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Paul Hoffman, a veteran ATS litigator, commenced his argument by
describing the “principal issue” as “whether a corporation can ever be held liable
for violating fundamental human rights norms under the Alien Tort Statute.” 92
Justice Kennedy opened the questioning by asking not only about corporate
liability, but also about the theory that the ATS permits United States courts
to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over human rights abuses anywhere in
the world.93
Most of Mr. Hoffman’s time was spent responding to persistent questions
from Justice Alito, with one question from Chief Justice Roberts, pertaining
to whether United States courts should hear a claim that arose in Nigeria and
was brought by Nigerian plaintiffs against companies based in Holland and
the United Kingdom.94 Justice Ginsburg observed that the questioning seemed
to address issues in Filartiga that had been resolved in Sosa, and that the case
before the Court pertained to corporate liability.95 However, Justice Kennedy
stated cryptically that “Filartiga is a binding and important precedent for the
Second Circuit.” 96 He then went on to ask whether the Kiobel plaintiffs could
have brought a lawsuit in another jurisdiction, commenting that the Filartiga
plaintiffs could only have sued in the United States.97 During rebuttal, Justice
Scalia inquired into Mr. Hoffman’s position as to whether aiding and abetting
liability was determined by domestic or international law.98
The United States supported the petitioners.99 Both Justices Kagan and
Scalia questioned Deputy Solicitor General Edwin Kneedler regarding whether
corporate liability was a matter of enforcement (i.e., a remedy) for a substantive
norm.100 Chief Justice Roberts prefaced a question to Mr. Kneedler by stating,
“under international law, it is critically pertinent who’s undertaking the conduct
of the immunity of a foreign nation from an ATS claim in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). It is true that the Supreme Court did not decide any ATS case
prior to the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), which
inaugurated modern ATS litigation and Sosa is the only ATS case where the Court has addressed the
post-Filartiga use of the ATS to vindicate international human rights.
92

Kiobel Hearing, supra note 4, at 3.

93

Id. at 3–4.

94

Id. at 8.

95

Id. at 13.

Id. It is not clear if he was implying that Filartiga was limited to the Second Circuit or to
the particular situation where plaintiffs had no other forums. Presumably, Filartiga was approved
by the Supreme Court in Sosa, and unless the Court says otherwise in Kiobel, is binding for the
entire country.
96

97

Id. at 13–14.

98

Id. at 55–56. Mr. Hoffman stated that international law would apply. Id.

99

Id. at 15.

100

Id. at 16–20.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2012

15

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 12 [2012], No. 2, Art. 2

318

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 12

that is alleged to violate international norms.”101 Justice Roberts seemed to reject
the argument that domestic law defines who is a liable party. He specifically
referred to the distinction between state and non-state actors, but Justice Roberts
may be indicating that he believes that the issue of corporate liability must be a
norm of international law.102
Kathleen M. Sullivan of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP argued
for the respondents and faced skeptical questioning regarding the corporate
liability exemption. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan tried to focus on
the issue formally presented to the Court—the corporate liability issue.103 In
contrast, it appears that the conservative Justices are more concerned with issues
of extraterritoriality and jurisdiction than corporate liability.
Since it may be difficult to justify an exemption from liability for corporations,
the anti-ATS Justices may be trying to stop ATS litigation by revisiting issues that
were decided in Sosa. It may also be easier for the conservatives to persuade Justice
Kennedy, who sided with the majority in Sosa, to reconsider the jurisdictional reach
of the ATS than to persuade him to hold that corporations enjoy immunity.104
Justice Sotomayor, who was not on the Court when Sosa was decided, did not
give any indication of her leanings and asked only two questions: one pertaining
to the difference between corporate liability and respondeat superior liability, and
one pertaining to the ability to sue under the Torture Victim Protection Act.105
The Court could have granted certiorari in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,106 a case
which addresses virtually all of the pending issues in ATS litigation including,
among other issues, whether various substantial torts constitute violations of the
law of nations and whether liability can be imposed for “aiding and abetting.”
The Court, however, did not rule on the petition for certiorari for Sarei. Instead,
it ordered supplemental briefing and re-argument in Kiobel to address “whether
and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350, allows
courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring
within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”107
101

Id. at 21.

102

Id. at 21–22.

103

Id. at 25–34.

Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, which held that corporations have the same rights as individuals for the purposes of
political contributions. 558 U.S. 50 (2010). It might be difficult for Justice Kennedy to now say that
corporations are not subject to the same liabilities.
104

105

Kiobel Hearing, supra note 4, at 21, 52.

See supra note 25 (discussing the Supreme Court’s apparent decision to hold Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-649)).
106

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491, 2012 WL 687061 (Mar. 5, 2012),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/030512zr.pdf.
107
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The Court will determine the jurisdictional reach of the ATS in Kiobel, and
possibly determine questions of aiding and abetting liability as well (“under what
circumstances” may refer to liability for accessory parties). The decision on these
issues may remove the need to decide the narrow issue of corporate liability at
all. If courts cannot recognize a cause of action occurring outside of the United
States, there is no need to decide whether corporations are immune from liability
for actions abroad.108

V. Conclusion
Although the conservative majority on the United States Supreme Court may
be hostile to the idea of ATS litigation, it is hard to see how the Justices can adopt
the blanket exemption from liability for corporations advocated by Kiobel. The
Second Circuit’s holding is an unprecedented departure from established case law
and has been rejected by all other courts to consider the issue. In addition, Judge
Jacobs’s admission that his position is motivated by policy considerations may be
tough for the conservative Court justices to swallow since they generally oppose
deciding cases on the basis of policy rather than strict construction of law.
It will be ironic if Kiobel ends ATS litigation. After thirty years of fighting—
involving hotly disputed legal arguments about numerous complicated issues that
could have been decided in a variety of ways—Kiobel presents a strange theory
that corporations enjoy immunity from civil liability, an argument most observers
believe has no merit and had long since been resolved. Nevertheless, that argument
has won opponents of ATS cases a ticket to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court may have been waiting for an excuse to end the nuisance that ATS
cases have posed, by simply denying that the ATS confers jurisdiction against
multinational corporations for violations of international law that occur outside
of the United States. 109

108
If the Court concludes in Kiobel that actions can not be brought under the ATS for
violations of international law that occur abroad, the Court will not need to decide the issues raised
in Sarei.
109
It is generally recognized that “international law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending on it are duly presenting for their determination.” The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700 (1900). However, the conservative majority on the Court has recently expressed clear hostility
to expanding the application of international law in United States courts. Cf. Medellin v. Texas,
552 U.S. 491 (2008) (limiting the enforcement of international treaties to treaties that have been
implemented by domestic legislation).
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